Health expenditures and prices have accelerated markedly in recent years, both in absolute and relative terms. The pressures for some form of govern mental intervention have generated widespread debate about national health policy. Determinants of health are complex, and policy development must follow the identification of issues and review of theoretical policy analysis. Formation of a theoretical basis will have a significant impact on substantive policy outcomes. Unfortunately, past and current proposals and policies have given insufficient attention to the traditional public finance criteria for gov ernment intervention; as a result, the importance of market forces has frequently been overlooked. Before wholesale rejection of the market as a means of promoting rationality, government should examine alternatives that foster increased effectiveness of the market mechanism. Even within this context, however, some form s of regulation will be necessary; also, traditional public finance norms would allow certain kinds of expanded government intervention. Market-perfecting policy instruments would result in different kinds of government programs, and much of future policy will be shaped by political decisions about substantive health policy issues.
The debate over a national health strategy is likely to continue as an important political issue for some time. The issues must be dealt with in broad terms in recognition of the wide variety of compo nents that enter into the "production" of good health. Moreover, the theoretical foundation on which governmental action can be jus tified must be clearly identified and articulated because the policy consequences of choosing a theory of intervention are significant. The options available for governmental intervention are numerous, but before moving to an exclusively regulatory approach, govern ment should attempt to reinvigorate the market as a device of social ordering in the health sector. This strategy would call for increased governmental regulation in areas where the market cannot reason ably be expected to function (for example, where a natural monoporly exists), but it would emphasize use of policy tools that retained MMFQ / Health and Society / Summer 1973 395 the decentralized market system of decision making where possible and feasible. Government policy would then be aimed at restoring the ground rules and promoting the conditions that are prerequisites for an effective market. Consistent with this orientation, govern ment could rationally justify support of compulsory insurance pro grams for emergency care and functional dislocation (or catas trophe). In addition, government could reasonably act to reduce the incidence of such illnesses through preventive measures. Al though presentation of these areas of additional governmental inter vention is not intended to be exhaustive, the discussion serves to illustrate the kinds of programs that could be justified under tradi tional public finance criteria for intervention.
Background
National health outlays have expanded both in absolute and rela tive terms at a staggering pace in recent years (Cooper and Wor thington, 1973) . For example, in fiscal 1972, national health ex penditures amounted to $83.4 billion, an increase of $7.8 billion above the previous year and a rise of 10.3 percent, yet the rate of increase in health expenditures in fiscal 1972 was the lowest incre mental rise since fiscal 1966.1 The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 is in large part responsible for the recent spurt of growth of the health sector. The Medicare and Medicaid approach expanded the effective de mand for medical services but did not simultaneously spur shortrun increases in supply. Over the past seven years, the predictable has occurred: The substantial increase in demand, unmet by any similar short-run increase in supply, has resulted in acute stress on the system. As would be expected by conventional theory, the sys tem has reacted to this imbalance by generating higher prices. Be tween 1965 and 1970, as care sector skyrocketed, rising at a rate of 6 percent, compared to a similar overall price increase in the economy of 4.2 percent (Rice and Cooper, 1972) . Some subsectors within the medical sector have experienced even greater price inflation, with prices in the hospital subsector rising by 10.6 percent in 1972, for example (Cooper and Worthington, 1973) .
To a significant extent, the current emphasis on health care is sues results from the runaway cost of medical services to consum ers. This striking increase in costs has dramatized, in a politically potent way, the importance people have placed on medical care. As a result, great political pressure has arisen for the federal govern ment to intervene to remedy the situation it helped create (U.S. Congress, 1971) .
With full recognition of the extraordinary cost of this inflation, there is still an argument that the unbalanced strategy adopted in the mid-sixties succeeded in compelling full-scale, comprehensive consideration of basic issues in the health field much sooner than would otherwise have been the case. Some have argued that the in ability to make important decisions is a major governmental short coming. Induced official decision making, in response to shortages and bottlenecks, may therefore prove beneficial in the long run. The stress on the medical sector brought about by the unbalanced strat egy of demand stimulation has dramatized the weaknesses in the system, making the consuming public acutely aware of the system's inadequacies. In just seven years it has not only become apparent but also widely accepted that there are serious problems which ne cessitate some form of significant governmental response.
The impact of the "unbalanced strategy" of Medicare and Medicaid has led to federal efforts to develop a coordinated health program. Typically, federal intervention in the health area has been on an ad hoc basis without any overall plan, formulation of ob jectives, or theoretical underpinning. In 1969, Robert Finch, then* Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, candidly acknowledged (U.S. Congress, 1970: 224) that: In February, 1971, and April, 1972 , President Nixon sent messages to Congress in which he outlined the need for developing a national health strategy, and in May, 1971 , the Administration issued a de tailed position paper. The liveliness of the ongoing debate seems largely attributable to the stresses resulting from the one-sided reli ance on demand stimulation of Medicare and Medicaid. Whether the costs will have been worth bearing is uncertain and depends in part on successful identification of federal health objectives, formu lation of federal health policy, and implementation of a federal health strategy.
The Basis for Government Involvement in the Health Sector
Public policy considerations regarding an appopriate federal role in health must not be restricted to a medical services orientation. To be sure, most of our discussion will focus on the medical care sector, but the complexity of the concept of health and the varied factors that contribute to its "production" must constantly be borne in mind.
The Concept of Health
The concept of health has a large social component. Illness may to a large degree be conditioned by culture, and its definition may be the product of a social bargaining process.2 There is a second im portant social consideration which must enter into health policy for mulation. A biological systems approach to illness, of course, is a critical aspect of defining the scope of the policy problem. Never theless, it is insufficient for policy purposes unless the functional ele ments of illness are incorporated into the analysis. Health is not an ultimate but an instrumental value-an en abling condition, which helps lead to what is now typically labeled an improved "quality of life." Consequently, from a policy perspec tive, it may be important to look at the impact of an illness in deter mining what the appropriate governmental response should be. In this regard, it might be helpful to shift our emphasis from health or illness to disability and dislocation.
The "Production" of Health
Physicians are trained to look at the human being primarily as a physical specimen-a functioning biological organism. Coincident with this orientation, it is no wonder that they are likely to view the question of health from a biological systems approach. The biologi cal orientation is understandable for those who are engaged in the delivery of medical care and may be serviceable for the medical practitioner, but it is not adequate as a basis for public decision making since the provision of medical care is not the only input in the "production process" of health. Normally, one thinks of going to the doctor because of an ailment and having the physician pre scribe a cure. Except for certain fields like public health, which em phasizes preventive medicine, the medical profession in the United States has been remarkably cure-oriented. Only recently has the notion of health maintenance received the public prominence that it should have. But still, we tend to think of health largely as the re sult of a successful visit to a physician for a remedial service.
However, if greater attention is to be given health mainte nance, with functional dislocation the major concern of policy, then serious questions of resource allocation arise within the health sec tor. Rational allocation of health dollars may require heavy invest ment in nonmedical items. In some societies, for instance, emphasis on such things as improving the quality of the community water supply or spraying against disease-carrying insects might result in the greatest overall increase in the community's health (Zubkoff and Dunlop, 1973) .
As we have noted, health maintenance has begun to receive attention among health professionals, but the concept still carries with it a top-heavy medical service orientation. Most significant for our society, there are a considerable number of environmental fac tors which contribute substantially to our health problems; any gov ernmental decision to become involved in the health sector must consider possible allocation alternatives in personal and nonperson al environmental areas as a means of promoting health.
Three families of environmental problems which contribute to poor health are especially worthy of note. First are what might be called technological factors resulting from industrialization. The most common example of this type is air pollution. Unsafe working conditions and accidents resulting from defective equipment are other examples within this category of environmental factors which contribute to health risk.
A second category of environmental considerations might be called personal health maintenance. Under this heading are such things as overeating and failure to exercise. Health experts now be lieve that personal lifestyle habits have an important bearing on the incidence of disease. Also in this category are accidents of another type-those which result not from defective machinery (which of course might also arise from careless workmanship) but from per sonal carelessness or negligence. Accidents, caused both by defect and by human failure, account for a substantial amount of the cost associated with the health sector (U.S. Department of Health, Edu cation, and Welfare, 1971:28-30) .
The third category of environmental considerations is socio economic status. It seems that the poor experience greater incidences of illness and shorter life expectancy; however, this is only partly the result of inadequate medical services (Antonovsky, 1967) . A significant factor is poverty itself because it is accompanied by such things as inadequate sanitation, overcrowded housing, and bad nu trition (Lave and Lave, 1970: 255; Kadushin, 1964) . In this re gard, governmental programs which seek to alleviate specific condi tions related to poverty have a significant health component; in determining an appropriate governmental response to health prob lems, the alternative allocation possibilities and their potential effect on improving health must be considered. It may be, for exam ple, that emphasis on personal medical services may be an uneco nomic allocation of health dollars unless a certain minimum stand ard of environmental quality is established (McDermott, 1969) .
The Rationale for G overnm ent A ction
In developing a federal health strategy, the government must identi fy its objectives. And implicit in this process of problem identifica tion and goal formulation is an adoption of some theoretical basis on which to center governmental intervention.
The principles that have evolved in the field of public finance are founded on some normative judgments. Public finance norms assume that the market is the best means for allocating scarce re sources. There is also an implicit assumption that the government in a democratic society promotes the welfare of individual citizens and does not necessarily act for the welfare of an organic society. This basically individualistic ethic is not limited to public finance theory but is reflected in other fields such as law.
A major policy question is thus whether to accept the public finance criteria for determining an appropriate federal role. Before addressing that issue, though, the traditional criteria for interven tion will be discussed.
The basic economic justification for governmental intervention is as a remedy for some market failure. In essence, the traditional basis for governmental involvement has been remedial, when the market, for one reason or other, does not achieve an efficient allo cation of resources. When traditional criteria serve as the basis of governmental action, substantive policy outcomes are left to the de centralized, impersonal marketplace; government's role, in this tra ditional regime, is primarily procedural, restoring the process of the market (or if necessary approximating the results which would have been achieved by a functioning market).
Traditional Criteria. Four traditional public finance criteria for gov ernment intervention are (1) externalities, (2) public goods, (3) monopoly, and (4) other market imperfections.
Externalities. Where there is a divergence between private and pub lic costs and benefit, the competitive market system will not auto matically achieve the social optimum. In these circumstances, some form of governmental action may be justified-either regulation, taxation or subsidy.
An externality is a direct influence of a producer's or a con sumer's activity on the activities of other producers and consumers that is not evaluated or accounted for by the market. The market system is characterized by general interdependence and interaction among producers and consumers, but their interacting influences are exerted "indirectly" via relative prices within the market mech anism. Externality-generating influences, however, are exerted on producers and consumers "directly," outside the market mechanism (Mishan, 1971 :2). They are not the deliberate outcome of a mar ket relationship but rather an unintended or incidental result of le gitimate but unrelated activity.
In the health field, national efforts historically have been di rected primarily toward disease control and prevention in the area of public health (Chapman and Talmadge, 1970) . From the outset, there has been little controversy about the propriety of some gov ernmental role in combating epidemics; the government initiatives involved both prevention of communicable disease through immu nization and control of epidemics through such measures as quaran tines. The mandate for governmental intervention in public health, in traditional terms, arose from the very clearcut externalities in volved in the spread of communicable disease. Understandably, and predictably, governmental initiatives in public health came early and drew widespread support.
The early federal emphasis on public health conforms to the traditional public finance criteria for government involvement since the private decision about prevention or cure does not reflect the to tal societal cost calculation. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance and constitutional legitimacy of govern mental action, for example, in compelling smallpox vaccinations, even when the person involved claimed that his religion forbade the use of medicinal aids (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 1905) . Thus, governmental initiatives in public health have widely been recog nized as justified in order to overcome the inadequacy of private decision making; this intervention, even by compulsion, has been sustained in the face of a constitutional challenge which pitted against governmental intervention the rights of free exercise of reli gion, a value whose special status is guaranteed by the First Amend ment.
Public Goods. A second traditional basis for governmental involve* ment is the so-called public or social good. A public good is really an extreme example of an externality, a case in which benefits are entirely external (Musgrave, 1971:306) . The decisive characteris tic of a public good is that one individual's consumption does not interfere with anyone else's. In this sense, then, consumption of a public good is nonrival and contrasts with a pure private good from whose consumption the particular consumer derives the entire bene fit.
Frequently, public goods are characterized by an inability to exclude people from the benefits that accrue. For example, national defense is often used as the typical illustration of a public good; the oretically, all citizens alike benefit from construction, say, of an air craft carrier, and it is impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to exclude people from benefiting. As a consequence, no individual has an incentive to reveal the true value of the benefit because he will gain regardless of how much he contributes. This is commonly referred to as the "free-rider" problem. Private choice, in the aggre gate, may not be a satisfactory process of decision making for achieving a socially desired outcome because of the difficulties of accurately determining true values in the market.
In the health field, the results of a successful immunization program may be characterized as a public good. Consumption is nonrival, and all members of the community share in its benefits without exception. The individual decision about treatment for a communicable disease is an example of a private decision that has external effects, but the "production" of epidemic control warrants governmental intervention because it is a public good of which con sumption is nonrival.
Monopoly. A third traditional basis for governmental involvement is the monopoly case, of which there are two forms. The first occurs when cost structure and market size make competition inefficient and unfeasible. If market size and production technology allow a single firm to operate in the decreasing cost portion of its long-run cost curve, with any additional output at lower marginal cost, then the economies of scale cannot be exhausted at any given level of market demand. This form of monopoly is called a "natural mo nopoly." The utility companies are often cited as the example of this form of monopoly. In the utility case, the economies of scale in production and distribution are so marked that if several companies were in competition, costs would be substantially higher and signifi cant inconvenience and misallocation of resources would occur.
The second type of monopoly is an "unnatural monopoly." An unnatural monopoly has been able to create an artificial situation, in which a producer is supplying its market with a good for which there are no close substitutes. The monopolist, in order to maximize profits, will restrict output and charge higher prices. The presence of a monopoly indicates a breakdown in the per fectly competitive market and therefore justifies governmental inter vention. With respect to "unnatural monopoly," regulation is aimed at restoring the conditions of competition in the marketplace, thus assuring that the economic game is played according to the rules of the market. Antitrust is a policy tool designed to promote competi tion and to prevent monopolization. With respect to "natural mo nopolies," however, the maintenance or reestablishment of competi tive conditions is not a desirable policy response. The public utility model has been used in these cases. Returns on capital are permit ted, but, through price regulation, these returns are supposedly kept as close as possible to those earned in the competitive market.
Characteristics of both the "natural" and "unnatural" monop olistic situations exist in the hospital subsector. The hospital is ap parently subject to significant economies of scale in its production process (Hefty, 1969) . As a result, hospitals in many communities probably operate in the decreasing cost portion of their long-run cost curve, and many small communities cannot hope to have more than one hospital. These isolated rural hospitals are essentially nat ural monopolies in that they are providing a service for which there is no close substitute and in which additional entry is not economi cally feasible because of the high capital cost and economies of scale.
Some observers report that hospitals are also monopolies in terms of patient access. In general, patients do not have a free choice concerning the hospital to which they are admitted because certain traditional characteristics of the physician-hospital relation ship and the physician-patient relationship have limited access. Since the patient's lack of knowledge forces him to rely upon the physician's decision whether or not to hospitalize, and since the physician in turn is limited to those hospitals in which he has privi leges, patient choice is curtailed not only by the number and loca tion of hospitals but also by the institutional relationships between doctor and patient and doctor and hospital. This form of institu tional constraint can be addressed by government policy that pro motes access; it is not a "natural" monopoly, and policy tools aimed at opening up the system would be appropriate under the traditional criteria.
Monopoly elements also exist in the physician market through restriction on entry. The artificial shortage of physicians has result ed primarily from federal and state legislation concerning licensure requirements and from the educational requirements established by the American Medical Association. It has been argued that supply has been limited in order to restrict competition and thus allow physicians to set their own (higher) prices (Kessel, 1970; Kessel, 1958; Friedman and Kuznets, 1954:137) ; thus, the physician's monopolistic position must be classified as an "unnatural monopo ly." This implies that government should modify those regulations restricting supply or impeding factor substitution.
Other Market Imperfections. There are situations in which the con ditions of the competitive system do not obtain but which do not conform to the specific criteria for intervention already discussed. One of the foremost assumptions of the competitive model is that there is perfect knowledge in the market. The concept of "consumer sovereignty" cannot operate when the consumer is unable to make an informed choice. In the medical sector, consumers often lack the expertise required to make informed judgments. Because of this, the patient must delegate to the physician much of his freedom of choice. Consequently, although the traditional competitive model assumes that demand and supply are independent, demand in the medical sector depends largely on the judgment of the physiciansuppliers (the "dependence effect" ). The number of visits to the physician, the kinds of laboratory tests called for, the decision to hospitalize or not and for how long, and even the need for surgical operations are normally based on the judgment of the physiciansupplier (Feldstein, 1968) .
The perfect knowledge assumption of the competitive model also implies that there is no uncertainty within the market concern ing future events. The unpredictable incidence of illness and acci dents creates difficulties for the individual. Statistical indices can be worked out for large groups, but the incidence of sickness for an in dividual is largely random. Moreover, it is unlikely that a consumer is able to assess accurately the probability of illness and the costs involved should disability or catastrophe strike (Calabresi, 1970) . In addition, dislocation may result from catastrophic or debilitating illness or accidents; this often means prolonged recuperation and absence from work. Consequently, exacerbating the unpredictability of illness are the severe consequences of dislocation.
Another problem in analyzing the medical sector is the unde finable nature of the output produced. Since each medical service is difficult to define or standardize, the medical sector does not pro duce a clearly defined unit. But until a single definition of health has been accepted, the concept of output cannot be clarified, and even if "health" could be defined precisely, it would still be difficult to measure. Researchers have suggested the use of proxy variables to represent the product. Some of these are the number of patient visits, the number of patients for outpatient services, the number of cases, patient days, bed days, or gross measures such as morbidity or mortality rates. These measures have proved useful in the devel opment of certain internal management control procedures, but, in the context of a broader conceptual perspective, the measures lack both comprehensive and adequate focus on the rationale behind the provision of medical services. Consequently, changes in the medical delivery system which increase the number of hospital days or pa tient visits may or may not result in an improvement in the popula tion's health. The problems associated with defining output and measuring productivity simply emphasize the nonhomogeneous na ture of the product involved. Without a measure for productivity, comparisons between programs or the evaluation of a single pro gram in terms of quality of care and the efficiency of production are difficult. What is needed is an evaluation methodology which, in stead of focusing separately on inputs or proxy output measures, would combine both the input and output concepts into one method ology. The process of defining output for the health sector is made even more difficult because most health services represent a combi nation of both consumption and investment aspects which are diffi cult to separate.3 Many services are considered investments be cause they increase the productivity and extend the working life of the employed members of society. Other services provide temporary relief from pain and suffering and yield immediate benefits to the individual only in the current time period. Since outlays for medical services have both consumption and investment components, and since such classification is difficult and imprecise, output measures for the health industry are speculative at best.
The important role played by the nonprofit institutions in the medical care sector poses more difficulties in relation to the work ings of the competitive model. The profit motive encourages techni cal efficiency and low-cost production. The marketplace disciplines firms that become overly inefficient. Nonprofit producers do not have the same pressures for efficient production nor the same incen tive to adjust output in order to achieve higher profit (Newhouse, 1970; Lee, 1971 ). This problem is exacerbated by the form of third-party cost-plus payment that characterizes existing medical in surance plans (Pauly and Drake, 1970; Havighurst, 1970) . Such a system of reimbursement provides few incentives for either the hos pital or the physician to achieve greater efficiency, and leads to higher consumer costs.
In short, many of the distinctive characteristics of health and medical services satisfy the traditional grounds for government in tervention. The irregular, uncertain, and sometimes communicable nature of illness, the unusual characteristics of the inputs and out puts, and the unusual forms of organization utilized to deliver health and medical care indicate that some form of government in volvement is called for.
Merit Goods. Traditional public finance criteria for governmental intervention do not challenge the underlying assumption of consumer sovereignty. Governmental action is necessary to achieve the re sult that, but for various imperfections, would have been achieved through operation of the market. But the objectives of government policy in the traditional scheme of things must be quite limited, par alleling as closely as possible the outcome of the market and devia ting from the market system itself as little as feasible.
In recognition of the fact that government often acts in ways which do not conform to the traditional public finance criteria, economists have developed a concept of a "merit good" as a basis for governmental involvement. The satisfaction of merit wants is provided for through the public budget, apart from what is pur chased by private consumers. "The satisfaction of merit wants, by its very nature, involves interference with consumer preferences" (Musgrave, 1959:13; Musgrave, 1971:312-313) . The theoretical underpinning for the merit good concept, how ever, is rather flabby at this point. Clearly there are very significant redistributional aspects to the substitution of collective consumer decision making for the market. But more is at stake than redistri bution. Since the provision of services is defined categorically, as in some of the proposed compulsory national health insurance pro grams, the eligibility criteria may not impose any means test.
At least two explanations are offered for the presence of merit goods. The first is a basic rejection, for a spectrum of items, of the notion that people know what is in their own best interests. No mat ter how this argument is sliced it is paternalistic. Basically, the rationale is that in certain cases there is inadequate consumer infor mation or insufficient consumer expertise to evaluate options. Ei ther through misleading advertising or through lack of expertise, consumers may not have sufficient information or competence to make intelligent consumer purchases. Some see this as a justifica tion for governmental imposition of collective consumer choice through the political system.
But another link in the analytical chain is necessary before this conclusion is warranted. Lack of information can be remedied by governmental regulation which requires producers to make avail able accurate data on their products. The "Truth in Lending" statute and the various labeling statutes are attempts to improve the infor mation at the disposal of the consumer so as to approach the com petitive ideal of perfect knowledge. Only if providing this information is unacceptably expensive is the alternative of collective pur chase justified. It is, of course, possible that in some cases informa tion costs are so prohibitive that other action is necessary. But im position of collective consumer choice in such a situation would, presumably, still attempt to mirror the outcome of the marketplace as closely as possible. Consequently, this basis for intervention does not explain why provision of a "merit good" rests on a different theoretical foundation from more traditional forms of intervention, such as labeling. Nor does it explain why, if the redistribution ele ment is put aside, medical care should be supplied through the fed eral budget. Provision of medical services through the federal bud get will not enhance the ability of the average citizen to understand the factors involved. If an explanation is to be found for the politi cal mood that medical services should be provided to all as a right, we must look elsewhere than the lack of information or expertise.
A second explanation of the merit good phenomenon is that it is a case of disguised (or at least controlled) redistribution (Musgrave, 1971:315) : "What seems to be a case of merit goods may, in fact, reflect interdependence of utilities and their provision may be an instrument of redistribution." Seen this way, the merit good label turns out to be applicable to any categorical program of assis tance. These programs have been roundly criticized by many welfare economists who claim that transferring nonnegotiable commodities is a less efficient method of redistribution than substituting money for in-kind transfers. In effect, the market economists argue that transfers in kind deprive the recipients of the right to choose freely their own marketbasket of goods, and that this creates waste at a net cost in welfare.
The merit good construct seems like an attempt to explain why, despite constant academic criticism, politicians continue to ad vocate categorical assistance programs. Redistribution may be in the nature of a social good with interdependent utilities so that A derives satisfaction from B's consumption, especially if B's income is low relative to that of A. From this perspective, a merit good may be an example of a voluntary redistribution, and the donor may gain more satisfaction if the donee consumes medical care rather than whisky. For this reason, it may be easier to muster a political consensus for provision of medical care as a right than for a redis tribution of a similar amount of income through a direct grant.
The public reaction of alarm and indignation to the demogrant proposal of Senator McGovern in the 1972 presidential campaign is evidence that the political phenomenon exists. The explanation may be that the price exacted by these voluntary donors is control of the way the redistributed funds are spent. Thus, we come full circle. Again, we have a paternalistic reason for this type of control, al though with a different motivation for the paternalism. The condi tion on which the redistribution is given is the loss of consumer sov ereignty for the donee.
One further word for the theoretical discussion in the medical care context is now appropriate. The political decision to provide categorical assistance through the federal budget for personal medi cal services was made in 1965 with the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid. From a pragmatic point of view, therefore, it is only rea sonable to acknowledge that medical services have been defined as a merit good, at least for the medically indigent and the aged. This poses a troublesome conceptual question about the current debate over compulsory national health insurance for everyone. Since the medically indigent already are the beneficiaries of Medicaid assist ance, what is the argument for compulsory universal national health insurance? If the redistribution goal is largely inconsequential, we are left with the information-competence argument. But those who are not medically indigent could assume the burden voluntarily of insuring against the risks of illness. Moreover, if government took steps to assure a competitive market for insurance, consumers would be able to choose from among a variety of packages instead of being confined to a single, govenment-imposed medical marketbasket.
An argument can be made that individuals rationally might vote to tax themselves for medical insurance as a means of forced savings. This would apply especially to those unable to discipline themselves to invest in medical insurance if left with money which could be spent on more immediate pleasures. The argument has some superficial appeal: let the weak-willed, who recognize their own infirmity, pull the magic political lever once and assure them selves of adequate savings to purchase medical insurance. But why should the political system be used by a majority (by assumption) to impose on an unwilling minority a consumer good which (by hy pothesis and by definition) the minority chooses not to consume (at least not in the form presented in the compulsory system)? As long as the only actor involved is the individual voter who is in the ma jority, there is no problem. But when the minority voters are brought in, the issue of an imposed choice must be faced. In some cases, failure to impose the majority will could result in deprivation for the majority because the good cannot reasonably be purchased or produced in any other way. But in the case of medical insurance, a private market exists. If a consumer is afraid of himself, there is a means of privately forcing saving-through contractual arrange ment in which an individual can bind himself to save by creating le gally enforceable obligations. Through this system of private order ing with the force of law, individuals can effectively limit their own freedom but at the same time not impose their consumer choices on an unwilling minority because of their own frailties. So long as ade quate alternatives exist-e.g., private ordering through contract and governmental action to promote greater consumer choice among in surance packages-it is difficult to justify compulsory medical in surance on the basis of the forced-saving argument.
One might also argue that without compulsory national health insurance a dual system of medical services will be perpetuated, one for the relatively affluent and one for the poor. The argument pro ceeds as follows: because of its importance, nonindigents have a duty to supply adequate medical care to indigents; but a system that does not include governmental financing for the nonpoor may allow for inferior care for the poor, and so equality demands that univer sal government financing be made compulsory so as to eliminate a dual system. This argument is weak on at least two grounds. First, conceptually, the merit good approach would seem to warrant re distribution in kind of medical services that could be characterized as basic or necessary (Michelman, 1969) . Once the duty of society to provide adequate care is met, however, inequality in provision of additional services is no more (and no less) of a societal problem than any other inequality in access to goods or services. The "spe cialness" of medical care exists only up to a certain threshold; be yond that it becomes just another consumer item. Implicit in the ar gument that nonindigents have a duty to provide access to care to those who could not otherwise afford such access is an under standing that inequalities in total consumption may continue to ex ist as they do in other sectors of the economy. Indeed, it is unlikely that any system of compulsory national health insurance would bar consumers from spending supplementary private funds for addition al medical care, and if this option is left open, a "dual" system will develop in any case.
Second, even if unequal consumption of medical services is ad mitted, a proponent of compulsory national health insurance could point to the access to quality-care problems that have faced Medi caid patients. But if indigents have command of sufficient resources to purchase an adequate level or package of care in the market place, only imperfections in the market would inhibit their purchase of mainstream medicine. This is not to deny the problems the poor have had in gaining access to first-rate physician services or in hav ing as broad a scope of choice as those who pay fees out of their own pockets (and who are likely to have socioeconomic, cultural, or racial backgrounds more akin to a physician's other patients) . It is to state that a remedy for that problem could and should be fashioned that more precisely deals with the access-to-quality-care problem. The imposition of a compulsory, universal national health insurance program is not a policy instru ment tailored to deal with the problem identified and may not even contribute to its amelioration.
It could also be argued that compulsory health insurancethat is, health insurance as a universal merit good-is necessary because individuals cannot assess correctly the probability of inci dence of debilitating illness (Calabresi, 1970:55-58) . The infor mation cost associated with fully educating consumers of the dan gers of disability might well be exorbitant. Moreover, as with Social Security, there may be serious secondary effects upon third parties when a person is disabled and, in the case of medical care, society (either through government or charitable agency) would likely come to the aid of an unfortunate disabled person. In such a case, a consumer might be likely to purchase less disability insurance than he might otherwise, relying on society to bail him out if something goes wrong. For this reason, the political process might be the only way to achieve an optimal solution. However, the lack-ofknowledge-extreme-side-effects argument can be stretched only so far; it does not cover nondisability or nonemergency situations and, moreover, conforms to the traditional criteria for intervention. The merit good theory is not needed to deal with this situation.
The political decision about the scope of the merit good in medical services is important for policy determination. If the mer it good concept is applied, then policy makers must think in terms of substantive policy objectives and priorities, not only of remedial procedural tinkering. The result of such a governmental decision is increased governmental (and most likely centralized) control over the allocation process in the health field, and the types of policies formulated and programs developed would have markedly different objectives.
The Range of Choice for Governmental Intervention
Any discussion of the strategy for governmental intervention in the health field must first take stock of the tools available to the govern ment. The selection of tools will depend in large measure upon what resolution the political process reaches on the merit good is sue. If government continues to treat medical services as a federal program of categorical assistance for the poor and the aged, an as sumption made here, then such issues as adequate access (both fi nancial and geographical), determining the precise scope of the bene fit package, and defining the class of people to whom the package will be provided will receive highest priority. If government inter vention is based more on the criteria reflected in the traditional model, then the primary focus of policy will be restoration of the market as a functioning institution.
Determination of the breadth and depth of the benefit package is the major demand-side issue, and the problem arises once the de cision is made to provide medical care through the budget to cate gorically defined groups. On the supply side, various tools are avail able both in cases where traditional criteria govern and where the merit good concept prevails. At one extreme, government could do nothing at all if the market mechanism is functioning well. At the other extreme, government could supply directly all medical serv ices, in effect expanding the VA hospitals to provide care to the en tire civilian population. In between these extremes are the following forms of intervention: (1) piecemeal dynamic intervention aimed at restoring the market mechanism; for example, reducing the bar riers to entry by modifying licensure requirements and reducing the monopoly power of voluntary medical associations; (2) ad hoc static regulation aimed at short-run symptomatic remedies; for ex ample, utilization review and wage and price controls; (3) regula tion of output by a regulatory body such as a public utility commis sion with control of such things as product, pricing, investment, and cost standards (Posner, 1971) .
At present, government policy primarily reflects a heavy reli ance on such short-run symptomatic remedies as price controls. The outcome of the political debate about the basis for involvement will largely determine the shape of future federal programs in the health field.
Two illustrations will help indicate the differences in concern that can arise from differences in the orientation of federal policy. The supply of providers has not kept pace with the rapid increase in demand for medical services. There may be many reasons for this gap, but the longer the lag time between increased demand and ulti mate supply response, the greater the impact of increased demand on the economy. Diminishing the length of the supply-response lag is an example of a market-perfecting policy for government. Con sistent with such a goal would be encouraging medical schools to in crease their output of new physicians by reducing the required training from four to three years. Similarly, government could re duce the institutional barriers to entry (as reflected in the various li censure laws) by relaxing the formal educational requirements for medical manpower. Again, by altering the institutional require ments, government would be fostering increased supply by "dynam ic" regulation.4
Intervention on the supply side through subsidy would have to be justified by the presence, say, of externalities. Otherwise, govern ment policy based on traditional criteria must be limited to the function of facilitating market accommodation, without regard to substantive outcome. Along these lines, if the outcome of the mar ket's functioning were to mean that certain geographic areas would not have sufficient medical care, then the traditional model would adopt a "so be it" response. However, it is now clear that the politi cal judgment has been made that adequate access to medical serv ices is a major policy objective of the federal government (U.S. Congress, 1971) .
A second illustration of the influence on policy orientation of one's theory of intervention arises in the context of hospitals. There have been some suggestions that increased emphasis be placed on hospitals which operate on a for-profit basis. Proponents of this ap proach argue that proprietary hospitals have financial incentives to keep costs in line and that efficiency has been better in the for-profit ' The approaches to supply shortages mentioned above assume that the market adequately performs the allocative function but that structural and institutional rigidities operate so as to impede its proper performance. In such situations, government action, under traditional theory, must strive to restore competitive conditions. It is important, however, to underscore what assumptions underlie the traditional response. As prices in the health sector rise in response to the excess demand, the expectation is that increased in comes to health professionals will induce more people to become members of the health professions. As these new workers take their place in the pro fession, one would expect the imbalance of demand and supply to disappear and the extranormal increase in prices to dissipate. Therefore, it is appropri ate within the traditional framework to smooth the path of supply response or to act affirmatively to shorten the period of lag. It would be inappro priate, however, for government through subsidy to induce more people to pursue careers in the health professions in the absence of externalities or other public finance justifications. This allocation function is one for the market; if its functioning is restored, the results would follow rationally without explicit governmental inducement.
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hospitals. But one of the strongest counterarguments is that reliance on for-profit hospitals would mean that certain kinds of less profit able medical services would either be less available or would strain the financial resources of the voluntary hospitals. In essence, the critics of the for-profit hospitals argue that the hospital is a major focus of modem medical service delivery and that it must continue to afford comprehensive treatment for reasons of health policy. If a hospital were to cut back in areas in which profit levels were not high, there might be a concomitant deterioration in the quality of overall medical service. The solution to this problem adopted by the voluntary hospitals is that profitable medical services subsidize the less profitable.
Those with a market orientation would rebut the critics of the proprietary hospitals by arguing that since a subsidy is being paid for reasons of health policy, a more rational approach would be to determine on whose shoulders the subsidy should fall and then to subsidize openly either the voluntaries or the proprietaries on that basis. It may be difficult to justify a system which covertly taxes pa tients with profitable illnesses to support those with less profitable ones. So long as health policy dictates that less profitable illnesses need to be treated, these same policy considerations should be brought out into the open to determine who should pay for this sub sidy and at what level. It seems doubtful that one class of the sick should support another class without regard to such factors as in come. Nevertheless, the less affluent afflicted with profitable diseas es now subsidize the more affluent with unprofitable illnesses. The market-oriented would argue that health policy goals should be sub sidized through the budget, and that the rest of the hospital's opera tions should face market competition.
The purpose of the discussion of manpower and hospitals has not been to advocate one approach over another but rather to illus trate the consequences for policy of adopting one orientation or an other toward the appropriate basis of governmental action. The next sections address the question of whether the market mecha nism or the regulatory mechanism should serve as the basis for fu ture governmental involvement in certain areas of the health field.
Modes of Intervention: The Utility Approach
Since much of the impetus for review of the governmental role in medical care derives from the recent increases in costs to consum ers, it might seem logical for the government to grab the bull by the horns and focus policy directly on the stabilization of prices. The outcome of such a policy determination would be to choose the reg ulatory model as the best means of keeping down prices in the med ical care sector. There have been some suggestions, for example, that a public utility approach be used for regulation of hospitals. The American Hospital Association embraced this concept in Feb ruary, 1972 (Priest, 1970; American Hospital Association, 1972) .
Adoption of the utility concept amounts to a wholesale recog nition that competition and the marketplace cannot function effec tively in the medical sector. For two reasons, we reject the avenue of total regulation, at least at this time. First, the history of utilitystyle regulation in this country has been anything but encouraging; any argument for complete rejection of the market must bear a heavy burden in showing that the proposed solution is desirable and workable, and also that the alternatives are doomed to failure. We believe this showing has not been made. Second, a good case can be made that the market system itself has not been given a chance to operate in the medical sector in light of the special restrictions which have been imposed by government. For this reason, further reliance on the market as a mechanism for social ordering may still be an available option.
Recent criticism of public utility regulation has focused on three points (Donahue, Jr., 1971; Posner, 1971) . First is the diffi culty that a regulatory agency inevitably has in determining the le gitimate costs of the regulated firms. The agency cannot rely on the regulated firm's own calculations but must attempt to determine ac ceptable costs independently. This is an extremely difficult task in volving highly complex accounting, and the consequence of error may be either inadequate capital for the regulated industry or ex cess monopoly profits. The stakes are high whereas the mechanism is rather imprecise.
Second, price regulation may distort the incentives of the regu lated firm. For example, a firm that sells both regulated and unreg ulated products may seek to subsidize the competitive enterprise by allocating costs to the unregulated portion of its business. Also a regulated firm may attempt to take out nonmonetary profits in the way of prestige items like thicker carpets, bigger offices, a shorter work week, etc. The result of this is higher but less visible costs not easily susceptible to regulatory control. Third, public utility regulation is a political as well as an eco nomic process. Experience with regulatory agencies since the New Deal Era indicates that the regulated industries frequently exercise a great deal of control over their own regulation. This phenomenon is often more acute at the state level, and much of the regulatory activity in the medical care sector would most likely occur at this level. The proposal by the American Hospital Association for utili ty regulation by a state body is evidence that the industry feels that its interests will be well protected through state utility-type regula tion.
Given the track record of utility regulation, government should hesitate to commit itself wholesale to the regulatory path in the medical sector. A much heavier burden of justification would be necessary before commitment to such a total system could be justi fied. Not only is the history of public utility regulation undistin guished, but, in the context of the medical care field, special consid erations suggest that its extension would be unwise (Posner, 1971:8-10) .
One special problem is product specification. If a regulatory commission were to attempt to establish appropriate rates for physi cian's services, the problem would arise as to define what the good or service involved was. Unless this was defined with precision, a regulated firm could substitute an inferior product for the one which was the basis of the rate established by the regulatory com mission. Both the physician's and the hospital's service are much more amorphous products than typical products of regulated firms like electrical energy or telephone service. The technology of mea suring output in health is in its infancy right now, and there is wide spread disagreement about what output measures are appropriate. The real difficulty here is that the ultimate product-good health -is very difficult to measure of itself. Consequently, surrogate measures such as days off the job or days in the hospital are used, but these are at best only inadequate measures of output.
Another special concern in the medical care sector is cost con trol, but utility regulation is extremely weak in imposing cost con sciousness. Regulated prices are derived after determination by the regulatory body of a fair and reasonable rate of return. This proce dure provides an incentive for padding expenses on which a return can be earned and has the defects that inhere in cost-plus pricing. Consequently, utility regulation might very well exacerbate the in flationary pressures that already exist within the medical care sec tor.
Finally, organized medicine has time and time again shown its political clout.5 Since the history of utility regulation shows that the regulated often control the regulators, the prognosis in the medical sector is not good. If anything, the extraordinary political influence of organized medicine should signal a pause before acceptance of a wholesale regulatory takeover.
Modes of Intervention: Countervailing M arket-Oriented M echanisms
This discussion suggests, then, that in the medical care sector a dose of competition might be what the doctor ordered (Havigjiurst, 1970) . For example, the introduction of health maintenance organ izations (HMOs) may encourage greater cost consciousness in the hospital sector. At present, third-party reimbursement on a costplus basis is the general rule for hospitals. Moreover, most of the third-party payment schemes do not reimburse patients for ambula tory care but require hospitalization before reimbursement is per mitted. This structural bias toward hospitalization increases the cost of medical care because hospital care is the most expensive form of medical treatment. The HMO, through the prepayment device, will have an incentive to keep hospital costs down since incomes come from capitation fee, not fee for service. Reduced expenditures will result in increased income, so the prepaid HMOs will have an inter est both in bargaining with hospitals to keep costs down and in em phasizing ambulatory and other less expensive forms of care.
Furthermore, the HMOs will be in a position to deal effective ly in the marketplace. While consumers may not have the expertise to make medical decisions, and physicians may now have no incen tive to serve the role of intermediary on behalf of the patient, the reward system for the HMO will encourage it to act on the consum-6 One must wonder why there is much a push for regulation now on the part of hospitals. Possibly this desire to be regulated is a response to the in creased public pressure on hospitals to contain costs and at the same time meet community needs. A regulatory commission may serve the hospitalse.g., by keeping out low-service competition, or by protecting the hospitals from the public-but it seems unlikely to serve the public (Chapman and Talmadge, 1970) .
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S u m m e r 1 9 7 3 / Health and Society / M M F Q er's behalf in keeping costs down. Moreover, because of its profes sional expertise, it will be better able to deal effectively with hospi tals and other providers (Wolfe and Zubkoff, 1973) . Of course, the introduction of HMOs will be no panacea for the problem of consumer ignorance or hospital inefficiency. Espe cially in areas where there may be inadequate choice among health maintenance organizations, there may be a similar problem with re spect to fees set or quality of services offered by the HMO itself. We do not suggest that regulation has no place but rather that com petition does have an important role to play. The introduction of new institutions and new devices for consumer participation might well make the market a more viable institution for social ordering in the medical context than anyone has thought.
In the past, government has responded to the distinctive traits of the medical sector by imposing restrictions on the providers. The detailed licensure statutes, the comprehensive regulation and plan ning of facilities construction, and medical education are examples of the minute piece-meal manner in which the medical sector is now regulated. It might be time, however, to look toward the more tradi tional role of government in attempting to make the market work. If consumer ignorance is a major problem-and it is-then govern ment could become involved in more intensive health education programs.
One approach might be to establish roles such as health advo cates to whom consumers could turn for advice and who could serve as intermediaries on behalf of consumers in dealing with providers. Moreover, greater responsibility could be imposed on doctors to disclose the mysteries of their practice. Too many doc tors assume a role of aloofness so that patients feel inhibited from inquiring about what is going on. It is possible that legal institutions could have an effect "so as to compel the doctor to share critical decision-making power with the patient and to encourage the devel opment of a partnership mode in doctor-patient relations to re place the prevalent authoritarian pattern" (Yale Law Journal, 1970 :1534 .
In addition to helping foster a more open doctor-patient rela tionship, the legal system can limit the extraordinary dominance by the physician of the entire health profession. Current statutes fre quently preclude anyone but licensed physicians from providing certain care, even though there is far from clear evidence that such a requirement is necessary for quality care (Carlson, 1970) . Modi fications in licensure laws could therefore permit other health pro fessionals to assume broader responsibility6 and could perhaps re duce the individual's medical care bill by allowing for a different, less expensive "production technology" for good health. Many states have recently liberalized their licensure laws in recognition of the expanded roles that can be played by allied health professionals.
Other M odes o f Consumer Influence
There are other mechanisms which can also be used to foster more effective use of the market. To the extent that health maintenance organizations themselves suffer from lack of effective competition, consumer participation in the organization and management of the group could help alleviate some of the consumer complaints that currently exist while affording the providers insight into consumer attitudes and desires.
In an engaging recent book, Professor Hirschman (1970) dis cusses the problems associated with the deterioration of the quality of output of an organization. His discussion and analysis have rele vance for our discussion of nonregulatory mechanisms for promot ing operating efficiency and responsiveness in the medical sector. Hirschman notes that competition is a mechanism for restoring or ganizational efficiency and, in his terms, promoting recuperation. Hirschman points out that the process of recovery can be spurred by two different though interrelated phenomena which he calls exit and voice.
In response to an absolute or comparative decline in quality, some customers stop purchasing a firm's product or some members leave an organization. " [T] his is the exit option. As a result, reve nues drop, membership declines, and management is impelled to search for ways and means to correct whatever faults have led to exit" (Hirschman, 1970:4) . This process of exit is the one normal ly associated with the competitive market system; the discipline of the marketplace is imposed on a firm through the opportunity of consumers to go elsewhere.
However, there is another way in which consumers can seek improvement in the functioning of a firm or an organization. They can express their dissatisfaction directly to its management or through general protest. This is what Hirschman calls the voice op tion. This also causes management to seek possible remedies for the expressed dissatisfaction. Hirschman's work offers a theoretical ba sis for such things as consumer activities which focus on corporate responsibility.7
In terms of the medical care sector, Hirschman's analysis sug gests another private mechanism by which consumers can attempt to exercise a greater measure of influence, if not sovereignty. With out resorting to the traditional regulatory framework, government can foster private institutions and mechanisms througji which con sumers can enhance their ability to deal effectively in the market place. If HMOs prove to be monopolistic, for example, then gov ernment can institutionalize voice by consumers as a means of promoting continued operational vitality. In any case, the possibility of influencing organizational effectiveness in situations in which traditional modes of competition may be inadequate offers an alter native that should be explored further before wholesale regulatory takeover is pressed.
Illustrative Programmatic Intervention
To say that nongovernmental institutions that retain private order ing should be promoted is not to deny that some governmental intervention in the health field may be warranted, even under the tra ditional criteria. Of course, market-perfecting policies are appropri ate under the traditional criteria; so are such activities as public health and biomedical research, the first areas of comprehensive federal involvement. But persuasive argument can be made that the traditional criteria justify government involvement in at least three other areas. The types of intervention discussed in this section are illustrative of the kinds of programs that can be supported on the traditional theoretical foundation.
Emergency
The market for medical services is actually composed of several submarkets; an important submarket is that for emergency care.
Defining the precise boundaries of what constitutes emergency care surely is an uncertain venture, but hospital emergency rooms now typically break down their visits according to emergency and non emergency classifications (Zubkoff, 1971:120-134) . Similarly, under Medicare, hospitals that are not eligible for federal reimburse ment for general patient services are eligible for payment for emer gency services. The Medicare regulations establish guidelines de scribing the kinds of services and the circumstances that qualify as emergencies within the Medicare statute. Questions of definition and categorization still persist and sometimes necessitate adjudica tion (Carey v. Finch, 1970) , but, nevertheless, it does make sense to think of emergency care as a somewhat distinct submarket of the medical services market.
The market for emergency care is characterized by highly in elastic demand elasticity so that an increase in price has only a mini mal effect in reducing demand (Campbell, 1971:53-54) . In the normal nonemergency case, a patient may rely heavily on the physi cian's judgment to determine the quantity of medical services con sumed, but a patient can shop around for several opinions and even compare prices. As the Medicare legislation acknowledges, a pa tient confronted with a medical emergency faces a situation of non choice where even the limited options open to a patient with a non emergency medical problem are not available. The free choice of the marketplace does not realistically exist for a person with a med ical emergency.
Recognizing the distinctive characteristics of medical emergen cies, some courts have imposed a requirement on hospital emergen cy rooms to treat all comers without respect to ability to pay, even though those same hospitals may have no duty to provide nonemer gency care to indigents (Stanturf v. Sipes, 1969) . This approach re flects the attitudes with which medical providers and society at large respond to medical emergencies. Providers historically have given free emergency care more readily than nonemergency care. Also, society is more likely to respond charitably to an emergency than to a nonemergency situation.
On the one hand, emergencies are highly unpredictable, and services must be purchased as an indivisible package with the con comitant discontinuities of supply. On the other hand, providers and society are likely to feel an obligation to treat a patient in an emergency situation. In such a case, a strong analogy exists to So cial Security, in which compulsory insurance is justified on the ground that if an individual chooses not to insure himself privately, society will bear the onus of any mistaken private decision out of a sense that the elderly should not be permitted to go destitute.
In any case of emergency medical care, there is a strong argu ment that consumers will undervalue this insurance because of a calculation that if things get really bad, someone will bail them out. In this way, private decision making would permit a beggar-thyneighbor private choice. Thus, this is a case in which an externality may be involved, since the detriment resulting from a poor private choice does not fall on the individual himself but on others (society at large or at least on the providers of care). Such an analysis makes it possible to draw a parallel with the compulsory liability in surance that many states impose on automobile drivers. Since the burden of harm wrought by a reckless and impecunious driver falls not on that driver but on his victims, government can justifiably im pose mandatory insurance on the driver as a cost of operating his automobile. From the perspective outlined here, government financ ing of emergency medical care may be warranted on similar grounds. In those areas where competition among providers of emergency services is nonexistent or infeasible, some form of regu lation could also be supported under the traditional criterion of nat ural monopoly.
Dislocation
A second area in which government involvement may be appropri ate is dislocation-that is, illness or accidents that result in cata strophe or disability and therefore substantially disrupt the func tioning of a person as a social and economic being. Like emergency, dislocation may elicit charity from society; individuals' percep tion of this likelihood might result in an understated revealed pref erence by consumers for insurance to deal with emergency situa tions.
The concern with dislocation reflects the functional approach to health discussed at the outset (Mechanic, 1968; Wilson, 1970) . People unable to work may face a loss of income at the same time that medical bills impose a direct financial burden. To be sure, indi viduals can insure privately against many forms of dislocation, but the impact of a mistaken choice by a head of a household can have 424 major secondary effects on others who are dependent. It is unreal istic, for example, to expect children, given their subordinate role within the family unit, their lack of independent funds, and their limited access to information and limited experience, to make an in formed private choice weighing risks about catastrophe or disability. Similarly, there is little reason to impose parental risk prefer ences on children, especially since society normally assumes a spe cial responsibility to care for children whose parents are incapaci tated.
Of course, the protection-of-children argument runs the dan ger of proving too much, justifying potentially disruptive govern mental intrusion into the constitutionally protected realm of family rearing (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925; Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923) . But the decision of a parent to forgo dislocation insurance in favor of some other form of consumption significantly affects those members of the family unit whom society frequently feels obliged in other contexts to protect, even against their own parents. Compulsory education laws and prohibitions on child labor are il lustrations of governmental intervention to safeguard the interests of children. Since the burden of private error in the instance of dis location falls on others besides the chooser, traditional criteria for government intervention would permit compulsory insurance. Whether this type of program would unduly interfere with counter vailing values of family control of child rearing is the kind of analy sis that goes into constitutional decision making; suffice it to say that taxation of this type has not typically been considered a signifi cant infringement of parental prerogatives nor a substantial intru sion of government into intrafamily life.
By government action, losses that result from dislocation can be spread among many people (interpersonal loss spreading) and overtime (intertemporal loss spreading) (Calabresi, 1970:39-42) . In this way, the impact of functional dislocation on any individual or family would be reduced. The question then must be faced of why a system of total compensation for dislocation should not be established in the form of a comprehensive social insurance scheme. It is true that the current health policy debate has largely taken place in isolation from the simultaneous controversy over the no fault concept of automobile insurance, yet the issues that arise in determining the scope of governmental involvement in the health field must also be addressed in policy terms in the accident law field. One of the difficulties with adopting a governmental system of total insurance for dislocation is that it would very likely lead to an increase in disbursements for at least two reasons. First is that with out strict administrative limitations, such a reimbursement system would attract attempted freeloaders and promote overuse. Second, provision for comprehensive coverage for dislocation might reduce the incentives for people to exercise caution in their daily lives. To be sure, the problem of reducing the incidence of dislocation is more acute in the context of accidents than in the context of dis ease; nevertheless, the complexity of the "production function" of health does indicate that there may be significant ways to reduce the incidence of illness which causes dislocation. Thus, any system devised must balance the need for encouraging personal health maintenance with the need to ameliorate the problems brought on by dislocation.
Prevention
This leads to a third area of government involvement: preven tion. To the extent that some form of social insurance for disloca tion is implemented, an obligation falls on government to minimize, to the degree feasible, the incidence of dislocation. In the accident law field, reduction in the incidence and severity of accidents-pri mary cost avoidance in the parlance of Professor Calabresi-is achieved in part through rules of legal liability. From a health perspective, government can move broadly to help cut down on dis location. Examples of government movement in this direction are such measures as mine safety and general occupational health legis lation. Similarly, environmental programs that lower the incidence of debilitating respiratory illness also fall within this category, as do such social programs as sanitation, food inspection, and nutrition which help lower risks of serious disease. The government initiative in broad prevention programs is essentially a form of technological intervention so as to minimize the amount of dislocation with which it must cope. If a governmental response in cases of dislocation is warranted, an aggressive governmental role in preventive measures is also justified to keep the costs down-the counterpart of the objective of accident law to keep the primary costs of accidents down.
In addition, government emphasis on preventive measures may often be justified on the basis of the public-good features of many preventive programs and the externalities associated with such mea sures. For example, an improved water supply or cleaner air will benefit members of the community without consumption being rival (at least to the point of over utilization). Similarly, public health measures that seek to eradicate communicable diseases benefit those who are not directly immunized. Consequently, government support of preventive measures can be justified under the tradition al criteria both because they may contribute to a lower incidence of dislocation and also because delivery of preventive services is often characterized by public-good and externality-generating features (Zubkoff and Dunlop, 1973) .
Conclusion
The dialogue about national health policy is bound to continue into the foreseeable future. In this paper, we have attempted to put the issues of health policy into an analytical framework that will be use ful for those involved in policy formulation and implementation. It is our belief that insufficient attention has been paid to first princi ples of policy analysis; as a consequence, some previous and pro posed policy instruments have not and would not successfully ad dress the problems identified. More particularly, it is our view that policy must accommodate itself to the realities of the economic market and that additional attention should be given to governmen tal initiatives that promote increased effectiveness of the market as a device of social ordering. Of course, regulation will have a place in any comprehensive national health strategy, but intervention should follow from theoretical analysis and should encourage mar ket perfection wherever feasible and appropriate. 
